Workshop on the Economics of Social Insurance Policymaking:

Theories, Models, and Methods

Lectures by: Michele Boldrin University of Minnesota

Political Economy Models of

Social Security

Lecture 1: Overview of the Political Economy Literature concerned with Social Security and, more generally, intergenerational transfer institutions.

Lecture 2: Applications of political economy models to social security issue: fairness, political sustainability, efficiency.

0. General Purpose References

Alt, J.E. and K.A. Shepsle (eds),Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Becker, G.S., “A Theory of Social Interactions”, Journal of Political Economy 82, (1974), 1063-1093.

Buchanan, J.M. and R.D. Tollison (eds.), The Theory of Public Choice-II, University of Michigan Press, 1984.

Meltzer, A.H. and S.F. Richard, “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government”, Journal of Political Economy 89, (1981), 914-927.

Mueller, D.C., Public Choice II, Cambridge University Press, 1989

Olson, M., The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971.

Persson, T. and G. Tabellini, “Political Economics and Public Finance”, in Handbook of Public Economics, vol. III, 2002.

Stigler, G.J. (ed), Chicago Studies in Political Economy, The University of Chicago Press, 1988.

Lecture 1. The Political Economy of Intergenerational Transfer Institutions

Aaron, H. (1966) The social insurance paradox Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 32, 371-4.

Azariadis, C., Galasso, V. (2002). Fiscal Constitutions. Journal of Economic Theory 103, 255-281.

Boldrin, M. A. Rustichini, “Political Equilibria with Social Security”, Review of Economic Dynamics 3, 41-78.

Browning, E., “Social Insurance and Intergenerational Transfers”, Journal of Law and Economics 16 (1973), 215-237.

Browning, E. (1975). Why the social insurance budget is too large in a democracy?Economic Inquiry 13, 373-88.

Casamatta, G. and Cremer, H. and Pestieau, P. (2000). The Political Economy of Social Security Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102(3), 503-522.

Casamatta, G. and Cremer, H. and Pestieau, P. (2000). Political Sustainability and the Design of Social Insurance Journal of Public Economics 75 (3), 315-340.

Cooley T.F., Soares, J. (1999). Privatizing social security Review of Economic Dynamics 2, 731-55.

Epple, D. and Romano, R. (1996) “Ends Against the Middle: Determining Public Service Provision when There are Private Alternatives” Journal of Public Economics 62, 297-325.

Esteban, J.M. and J. Sakovics, “Intertemporal Transfer Institutions”, Journal of Economic Theory 61, 189-205

Galasso, V. (1999). The US Social Security System: What Does Political Sustainability Imply? Review of Economic Dynamics, 2, 698-730.

Galasso, V. (2002). Social Security: A Financial Appraisal for the Median Voter Social Security Bulletinn, 64.

Galasso, V. and Profeta, P. (2002) Political Economy Models of Social Security: A Survey European Journal of Political Economy 18(1), 1-29.

Hansson, I., Stuart, C. (1989). Social security as trade among living generations American Economic Review 79, 549-59.

D’Amato, M. and V. Galasso (2002). Assessing the Political Sustainability of Parametric Social Security Reforms: the Case of Italy Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia 61, 171-213.

OECD (2002). Policies for an Aging Society: Recent Measures and Areas for Further Reforms. Working Paper No.1 on Macroeconomic and Structural Policy Analysis

Rangel, A. “Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: Why is Social Security Good for the Environment?” American Economic Review, 2003, June, 93(3), 813-34